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The Future of the Multilateral Trading
System in the Context of TRIPS
By FREDERICK M. ABBoTr*
Preface
Stefan Riesenfeld is a preeminent authority in the fields of com-
parative bankruptcy law, European law, international economic law,
the law of the sea, public international law, and social security law, to
name some of his specialties. Not as well known is that Professor Rie-
senfeld studied physics in a Berlin seminar with Albert Einstein, or
that his friends from the days of his U.S. Navy service in the Pacific
remember him well for repairing his own radio communications
equipment!
Given his interest in science and technology, it should not come
as a surprise that Professor Riesenfeld has ventured into the field of
patent law, teaching patents and authoring several important articles
on the subject. When the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) Uruguay Round negotiations began, he promptly identified
the negotiations on trade-related aspects of intellectual property
rights (TRIPS) as one of the critical elements in the negotiations. He
saw that the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) had be-
come increasingly important to manufacturers and services providers
around the world. He saw that IPRs protection issues were moving to
center stage in the international economic arena.
Stefan Riesenfeld has spent his life trying to improve the living
conditions of his fellow man. From his early case book on the nascent
U.S. social security system, to his work on reforming Hawaii's public
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology;
Co-Rapporteur of the International Law Association Committee on International Trade
Law with responsibility for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS). This contribution is adapted from a lengthier article prepared for and presented
at a Conference on the Multilateral Trading Regime in the 21st Century: Structural Issues,
held at Columbia University School of Law, New York, November 3-4, 1995. A second
part of the article as presented at Columbia concerns the role of intellectual property in
global economic development. That part is not adapted here. The complete article will be
published in a book edited by David Leebron. This adaptation is published with his
permission.
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health care system, to his numerous articles on the protection of con-
sumers, to his life-long interest in the preservation of peace and secur-
ity in Europe and elsewhere, and to his advocacy of multilateralism in
international trade, his interest in human development and the equita-
ble treatment of the individual is self-evident. Stefan Riesenfeld en-
courages us to look at the international intellectual property system
from the standpoint of its capacity to improve the human condition.
He encourages policy-makers to seek a balance between the rights of
innovators and the well-being of the public in all nations.
I. Introduction
Intellectual property has assumed enormous importance in the
end-of-the-millennium global economic system. It plays an increas-
ingly important role in the national and international political and so-
cial arenas as well. We are presently in the midst of an information
revolution unparalleled in the history of mankind. This technology-
based revolution may well transform the way we think about intellec-
tual property in a manner that even the most prescient among us are
unable to foresee.
The organizers of the conference at which this Article was first
presented asked the participants to consider the future of the multilat-
eral trading system from a structural perspective, and to consider
making recommendations for the institutional future of the system.
The very rapid pace of technological development, and well-known
limitations confronting the human mind when it attempts to foresee
the future, cause us to approach with trepidation the structure of the
multilateral trading system as it will relate to intellectual property
some decades hence. Nevertheless, reflecting on the future causes us
to focus on existing institutional structures, and draws our attention to
some of the more evident potential obstacles to progress in the fields
of innovation, global economic development, and international intel-
lectual property fights protection.
In this spirit, this Article will approach the structure of the multi-
lateral trading system from the perspective of the relationship be-
tween the international institutions that are likely to be responsible
for regulating TRIPS.1 This includes an analysis of the future roles of
1. The international system for the regulation of intellectual property rights (IPRs) is
multileveled. IPRs are regulated multilaterally, regionally, and bilaterally at the interna-
tional level. IPRs are also regulated at the national and subnational levels. This Article
will focus on the multilateral system for the regulation of IPRs administer ed by WIPO, and
the multilateral trading system administered by the WTQ. The WTO and WIPO are the
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the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) in the TRIPS context. This subject
matter will be broken down into two aspects: the general question of
institutional roles in the ongoing management of IPRs-related rela-
tions, and the specific question of dispute settlement among states.
Since the recent entry into force of the WTO3 and TRIPS agree-
ments,4 there has been a substantial strengthening of institutional ties
between the WTO and WIPO. Steps have been taken that fore-
shadow a successful ongoing program of cooperation between these
two international institutions. Complex issues remain to be addressed
in the field of dispute settlement, however. Even here, the utility of
complementarity and cooperation can be foreseen. This Article
makes some suggestions towards the formalization of inter-institu-
tional relations that might assist in a long-term WTO-VIPO program
of cooperation. There is, fortunately, little basis on which to predict
an imminent inter-institutional failure in the TRIPS arena, nor is there
a substantial basis for proposing a major restructuring of TRIPS-re-
lated relations on the institutional front.
I. The Basic Institutional Arrangement
A. The WTO
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (TRIPS Agreement) entered into force on January 1,
1995.1 Application of the rules of the Agreement is obligatory for
most inclusive international organizations in the respective fields that form the subject
matter of this Article.
2. With respect to the TRIPS Agreement and VTO Dispute Settlement, see Freder-
ick M. Abbott, IVTO Dispute Settlement and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, in INTERNr ioNAL TRADE LAw AND THE GATT-WTO Dis.
PurE SEmrLmNmrr SysTEM (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., forthcoming 1997) [hereinafter
TRIPS Dispute Settlement]. With respect to the role of IPRs and the TRIPS Agreement in
economic development, see Frederick M. Abbott, The IVTO TRIPS Agreement and Global
Economic Developmen4 in PuBLic POLICY AND GLOBAL TEcI NoLoicAL INT-GP.AT IoN
39 (Frederick M. Abbott & David J. Gerber eds., 1997) [hereinafter TRIPS and Economic
Development].
3. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, in THE RE-
SULTS OF THE URUGUAY RouND OF MuLmILATERAL TRADE NEGOTATrONs: THE LEGAL
TEx-rs 6 (1995), 33 LL.M. 1125, 1143 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
4. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex IC,
id. at 366, 33 LL.M. at 1196 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
5. As a Multilateral Trade Agreement applicable to all WTO Members, the TRIPS
Agreement entered into force contemporaneously with the VTO Agreement. NWO
Agreement art. 11:2 & Annex 1C.
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Members in accordance with transitional arrangements. ' On January
1, 1996, the rules of the TRIPS Agreement became obligatory for de-
veloped country Members.7 At the same time, provisions with respect
to national and most favored nation (MFN) treatment became obliga-
tory. for all WTO Members.8 Developing country Members, Members
in transformation from centrally-planned to market economies, and
least developed Members, may elect to take advantage of transition
periods ranging from five to ten years, depending on the IPRs subject
matter involved and the Member's level of economic development.
Most TRIPS Agreement rules will become obligatory for developing
and transforming Members on January 1, 2000.9
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), the Council for Trade-Re-
lated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Council) has
been established as a component of the WTO governing structure. 10
Each Member of the WTO is entitled to membership on the TRIPS
Council." The TRIPS Council is responsible, inter alia, for monitoring
the operation of the TRIPS Agreement, including implementation of
its obligations by Members. The TRIPS Council is assisted by the
WTO Secretariat, particularly by the Director for Intellectual Prop-
erty and Investment, who is assisted by a small staff.'2
An important factor in the genesis of the TRIPS Agreement was
a perception among certain interested groups in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries that the
international IPRs system administered by WIPO was insufficiently
strong in terms of the establishment of substantive rules and the main-
tenance of mechanisms for the enforcement of those rules. Although
certain WIPO-administered conventions permit the referral of dis-
putes to the International Court of Justice for resolution, no such re-
ferral has ever been made, and this procedure was perceived by
OECD governments as inadequate. 3 A central purpose of the TRIPS
6. TRIPS Agreement art. 65.
7. Ia art. 65:1.
8. Id. arts. 65:2-3, 66:1.
9. IL arts. 65:2-4, 66:1.
10. WTO Agreement art. IV:5.
11. AL
12. Adrian Otten, WTO Director for Intellectual Property and Investment, Oral Re-
port to the ILA International Trade Law Committee, WIPO headquarters (June 22, 1995)
[hereinafter Report of Adrian Otten].
13. The Paris, Berne, and Rome Conventions provide for the settlement of disputes by
the ICJ. No such dispute settlement procedure has ever been undertaken. International
Bureau of WIPO, Committee of Experts on the Settlement of Intellectual Property Dis-
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Agreement negotiations was to move the center of gravity in the inter-
national IPRs arena from WIPO to the new WTO. The VTO would
become the central arena for the negotiation of primary international
IPRs standards. Most importantly, WTO institutional mechanisms
would be used to police the new international IPRs order. Thus, dis-
putes arising under the TRIPS Agreement are now subject to resolu-
tion by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in accordance with the
terms of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.14 Trade sanctions
may be collectively authorized to assure compliance by WVTO Mem-
bers with TRIPS obligations.
B. WIPO
WIPO is a Specialized Agency of the United Nations. 15 As a
matter of institutional history, the central objectives of WIPO have
been to provide a forum for international cooperation in the develop-
ment of rules to define IPRs, to administer the rules agreed upon, and
to provide technical assistance to Contracting States. 16 The objectives
of WIPO have been carried out by the negotiation of multilateral
IPRs conventions, including periodic revisions to such conventions
(e.g., with respect to the Paris and Berne Conventions), 7 the estab-
lishment of a Secretariat capable of administration at the international
level (e.g., to administer the Patent Cooperation Treaty),"' and the
creation of a staff of IPRs specialists capable of rendering technical
assistance (e.g., through the presentation of training programs).'"
WIPO is largely funded through revenues from its IPRs administra-
putes Between States, 7th Sess., May 29-June 2, 1995, WIPO Doc. SD!CEXIFS, para. 50,
at 13, (June 2, 1995) [hereinafter WIPO 1995 Report].
14. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Annex 2, art. 1:1, in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATErAL TPADE
NEGotrIA7oNs: Tim LEGAL Tsx'rs, supra note 3, at 404, 33 LLM. at 1225 [hereinafter
Dispute Settlement Understanding].
15. See WIPO, BACKGROUND READING MATERIAL ON INTELLEcrtIAL PnopaPTr' 37-
71 (1988).
16. Id.
17. The Paris and Berne Conventions were, of course, negotiated prior to the creation
of WIPO. The Paris and Berne Unions are now, however, incorporated within the overall
WIPO framework. Committees of IPRs Experts operate under WIPO auspices to draft
new multilateral IPRs instruments. This work is often of a highly technical nature.
18. WIPO administers the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and the other multilat-
eral IPRs conventions that require a centralized record-keeping function (e.g., the interna-
tional trademark register under the Madrid system).
19. WIPO also prepares periodic reports on the operation of the international IPRs
system. Its technical assistance programs extend also to OECD countries.
1997]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
tion operations, with Contracting States contributing only about
twenty percent of its operating budget.20
C. Cooperative Mechanisms
Ex post facto cooperation between the WTO and WIPO was fore-
seen. The TRIPS Agreement specifically directs the TRIPS Council
to establish mechanisms for cooperation with WIPO,21 and suggests
that the two organizations might work together in the establishment
of a common register of Member IPRs laws and regulations.22 The
TRIPS Agreement and related WTO agreements are permissive in
the sense of enhanced cooperation between the WTO and WIPO.
The TRIPS Council, for example, might seek guidance from WIPO in
the context of dispute settlement at the request of its Members.23
During periodic reviews of TRIPS Agreement implementation, the
TRIPS Council might consult with WIPO concerning the evolution of
multilateral IPRs rules.24
Formal actions have been taken to facilitate cooperation between
the two international organizations. In December 1995, the Director
General of WIPO and the Director General of the WrO signed an
agreement that facilitates exchange of the texts of laws and regula-
tions of WTO and WIPO members.25 The WIPO-WTO Agreement
also establishes a basic framework for cooperation in providing tech-
nical assistance relating to the TRIPS Agreement to developing coun-
try members of each organization.2 6 The WTO TRIPS Council and
the WIPO Governing Bodies have taken additional steps that facili-
tate cooperation. 27 The WIPO Coordination Committee (composed of
representatives of the WIPO Contracting States), to be assisted by the
Secretariat, has been designated by the WIPO Governing Bodies as
20. Francis Gurry, The Evolution of the Industrial Property Base and the Management
of Intellectual Property Rights, in PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRA-
nON, supra note 2.
21. TRIPS Agreement art. 68.
22. Id. art. 63:2.
23. Id art. 68.
24. Id. art. 71:1.
25. World Intellectual Property Organization-World Trade Organization: Agreement
between WIPO and WTO, Dec. 22, 1995, art. 2, 35 I.L.M. 754,756 (entered into force Jan.
1, 1996).
26. Id. art. 4. The specifics of this arrangement regarding cooperation in the provision
of technical assistance are not set forth in the brief paragraphs of the agreement. The
agreement is drafted with language sufficiently broad to permit a wide range of administra-
tive interpretations.
27. See Report of Adrian Otten, supra note 12; Gurry, supra note 20.
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the channel of communication between the two organizations. The
TRIPS Council has decided that the WTO and WIPO should use a
uniform system for notification by Members of IPRs laws, and has
agreed that this uniform system will be administered by WIPO. The
TRIPS Council has requested that WIPO provide assistance to Mem-
bers in drafting and implementing TRIPS-compliant IPRs legislation.
WIPO Contracting States have voted a substantial increase in re-
sources for assisting countries in modernizing their intellectual prop-
erty legislation and administrative infrastructures. Each of these
decisions and actions constitutes a significant step toward defining and
establishing a cooperative and mutually supportive relationship be-
tween the WTO and WIPO.
III. Potential Sources of Inter-Institutional Tension
A. Rule-Making and Enforcement
1. Rule-Making Conflicts
There is a clear basis for conflict involving the rule-making activi-
ties of the WTO in the TRIPS context, and WIPO. The potential dis-
pute settlement activities of the WTO and WIPO also represent a
potential source of tension. The TRIPS Agreement does not suspend
the independent operation of WIPO-administered multilateral IPRs
conventions. There is not a complete correspondence between the
Members of the WTO and the Contracting States of the WIPO con-
ventions. New IPRs conventions are under negotiation in WIPO, as
are amendments and supplements to existing IPRs conventions, in-
cluding those incorporated by reference in the TRIPS Agreement.2S
The TRIPS Council will review the implementation of the TRIPS
Agreement, and propose changes to this agreement as necessary or
desirable.2 9
The WTO Agreement and the TRIPS Agreement provide two
basic alternatives for amending of the TRIPS Agreement.U First, the
TRIPS Council may submit a proposal for amendment of the TRIPS
28. For example, the Berne Convention, the provisions of which may be supplemented
by the agreements discussed infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
29. TRIPS Agreement art. 71:1. See discussion infra notes 36-40 and accompan)ing
text.
30. The WTO Agreement establishes a number of alternative mechanisms for amend-
ment of the various multilateral agreement texts that are associated with it, including the
TRIPS Agreement. See generally WTO Agreement art. X. The two that are outlined in
the text above are the most likely to be employed in the TRIPS context.
1997]
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Agreement to the WTO Ministerial Conference, 31 following which the
proposal will be subject to the ordinary amendment prccedure of the
WTO.32 Under that procedure, the approval of a two-thirds majority
of the Ministerial Conference is required to submit an amending pro-
posal to the Members for acceptance. 33 An amendment becomes ef-
fective for Members that have accepted it following their two-thirds
acceptance.' Members may require the approval of their national
parliaments prior to accepting an amendment to the TRIPS Agree-
ment, so this amendment procedure may be rather time-consuming.35
The WTO and TRIPS Agreements also establish an expedited
amendment procedure for cases in which the purpose of the amend-
ment is to "adjust ... to higher levels of protection of intellectual
property rights achieved, and in force, in other multilateral agree-
ments and accepted under those agreements by all Members of the
WTO. '3 6 A proposal for such amendment requires a consensus vote
of the TRIPS Council,37 and such amendment may thereafter be
adopted by the WTO Ministerial Conference "without further formal
acceptance process. '38 Decisions of the Ministerial Conference are or-
dinarily taken by consensus, but in the absence of consensus, by a ma-
jority of the votes cast.39 Since any proposal under this expedited
procedure will have been subject to consensus voting :in the TRIPS
Council, a lower voting requirement at the Ministerial Conference
should not create difficulties. The most difficult threshold question
with respect to use of this expedited procedure is whether all Mem-
bers of the WTO will accept a multilateral agreement negotiated
31. The TRIPS Council establishes its own rules of procedure, subject to approval by
the WTO General Council. WTO Agreement art. IV:5. The TRIPS Ccuncil periodically
and specially reviews the TRIPS Agreement for developments that might warrant modifi-
cation or amendment of the Agreement. TRIPS Agreement art. 71:1.
32. WTO Agreement art. X:3-4.
33. lL art. X:1. The two-thirds vote requirement applies only after tie Members have
failed to reach consensus. It is the minimum vote required. Each WTO Member has a
vote in the Ministerial Conference. IdL art. IV:1.
34. Id. art. X:3.
35. While most states require the approval of parliament for the ratification of treaties,
rules vary with respect to parliamentary approval of amendments. Whether an amend-
ment requires parliamentary approval may depend upon its perceived significance or mate-
riality. See generally PARLIAMENTARY PARTICIPATION IN THE MAKING AND OPERATION
oF TREATIES: A ComzARAsTIvE STUDY (Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott eds.,
1994).
36. TRIPS Agreement art. 71"2.
37. Id
38. WTO Agreement art. X:6.
39. This is the case unless other voting rules are specifically provided for in the WTO
agreements. Id. art. XI:1.
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under WIPO auspices. Although the Paris and Berne Conventions
are the subject of wide adherence, based upon the historical record it
would be unusual for all 130 or so WTO Members to be parties to a
WIPO agreement.40
Rule-making activities in the field of the multilateral regulation
of IPRs have assumed great importance and are the focus of intense
interest. Questions relating to the protection of information transmit-
ted across the Internet system, the protection of satellite broadcasts
against misappropriation, and the time and place at which the exhaus-
tion of IPRs occurs, all loom large at the moment. There is obvious
need for additional rule-making in a number of other areas, and the
present rate of technological change makes it difficult to predict where
and when new issues will surface. Governments and interest groups
may have strong preferences with regard to the forum where rules are
negotiated for reasons relating to, inter alia, perceptions as to where
they hold the greatest negotiating strength, and perceptions as to
where they most likely will be able to enforce new rules.
The recently completed negotiations under WIPO auspices of
two treaties on copyright and neighboring rights, and the postpone-
ment of consideration of a related third treaty (on database protec-
tion), illustrate the process by which substantive rules will continue to
be adopted by the WIPO Contracting States.' Provisions of the
WIPO Copyright Treaty and the Performers and Phonograms Treaty
are intended to clarify the scope of protection for authors and artists
40. Both the Paris and Berne Conventions are the subject of vide adherence. Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property., Mar. 20, 19S37, as revised at Stock-
holm on July 14, 1967,21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. Berne Convention for the Protec-
tion of Literary and Artistic works, Sept. 9, 18S6, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and
amended by S. TREATY Doc. No. 27,828 U.N.T.S. 221 (1979). As of December 13, 196,
there were 140 parties to the Paris Convention, 120 parties to the Berne Convention, and
128 Members of the WTO. As of that date, for example, more than 25 Members of the
WTO were not parties to the Paris Convention. See Insert to WIPO Publication No.
464(E) (on file with author). Most other WIPO conventions are not subject to similar
quasi-universal adherence. For example, there are only 26 parties to the Hague Agree-
ment concerning the International Deposit of Industrial Designs. See Gurry, supra note
20, at n.15 and accompanying text. In addition, it should be noted that wide adherence to
the Paris and Berne Conventions was the result of many decades of development.
41. See WIPO Delegates Reach Agreement On Two of Three Copyright Treaties, 11
World Int. Prop. Rept. (BNA) 31 (Jan. 1997). For texts as adopted see World Intellectual
Property Organization: Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997) and World
Intellectual Property Organization: Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996,
36 I.L.M. 76 (1997). For WIPO Committee of Experts Chairman's Basic Proposal for a
Draft Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Databases, see WIPO Doe. CRNRWDC/
6, Aug. 30, 1996.
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as the media for the creation and dissemination of artistic works has
been reshaped over the past several decades. Proposals for these
draft treaties produced an intense debate among disparate groups
whose interests would be affected by their adoption.4 'If the treaties
are ratified and enter into force, substantive rules governing the inter-
national protection of copyrighted material will change as among state
parties to the agreements. In order for these changes to be adopted
by WTO Members as part of their TRIPS Agreement obligations, ac-
tion must be taken in accordance with the WTO procedures outlined
above.43
There is no guarantee that governments participating in negotia-
tions in both the WTO and WIPO will maintain the same perspective
on desirable rules in each forum. Some governments may conclude
that non-compliance with rules agreed to at WIPO should not be sub-
ject to the potential application of trade sanctions in the WTO. Some
governments may send trade specialists to negotiate in the WTO, and
IPRs specialists to negotiate in WIPO, and these negotiators may not
speak with the same voice.
State practice under both the TRIPS Agreement and WIPO-ad-
ministered conventions will continue, and will involve state parties
that are contemporaneously parties to all of the relevant international
instruments, as well as state parties that are not. Additional protocols
and regulatory provisions may be adopted in WIPO that are not con-
temporaneously approved or adopted in the TRIPS forum. These de-
velopments may lead to situations in which states may be in
compliance with the rules of the TRIPS Agreement and in derogation
of rules of WIPO-administered conventions, and vice versa.
42. See, e.g., The WIPO Diplomatic Conference, 11 World Int. Prop. Rept. (BNA) 31
(Jan. 1997); John Zarocostas, Treaty Talks Drop Audio-Visual; Europe and US Fail to Re-
solve Dispute, J. COM., Dec. 19, 1996, at 3A; Paul Lewis, No Accord Soon on Treaty For
Data Base Copyrights, N.Y. TimEs, Dec. 14, 1996, at A5; Group of CEOs Complains to
Clinton About Intellectual Property Proposal, COMm. TODAY, Dec. 12, 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Philps File.
43. Conceivably the parties to a WIPO agreement that are also patties to the TRIPS
Agreement could agree among themselves to apply new WIPO rules as i' they were part of
the TRIPS Agreement, without seeking a formal amendment of the TRIPS Agreement.
However, this would not ordinarily make available to them the use of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding to enforce the rules through the use of trade measures. These
parties could agree to arbitration under Article 25 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Under-
standing. Such an agreement would entitle them to make use of trade sanctions if, and as
authorized by, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. See WTO Dispute Settlement Under-
standing arts. 21-22,25. Such a limited agreement would frustrate the "single undertaking"
spirit of the WTO, returning to the multitiered set of international economic rules that had
frustrated Contracting Parties to the GATT.
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2. WTO Dispute Settlement
Analysis of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding and its
application with respect to disputes arising under the TRIPS Agree-
ment suggests that WTO dispute settlement panels will be required to
refer to practice under multilateral IPRs conventions administered by
WIPO in order to effectively interpret the TRIPS Agreement in some
circumstances." The TRIPS Agreement establishes minimum inter-
national IPRs substantive rules of three types45 The first type is es-
tablished by the incorporation of provisions of existing multilateral
IPRs conventions administered by WIPO, such as copyright standards
that incorporate Berne Convention provisions. The second type con-
sists of rules that are unique to the TRIPS Agreement, such as the
rules that establish the subject matter of patent protection. The third
type consists of hybrid rules that clarify or amend rules of existing
multilateral IPRs conventions, such as a rule clarifying that computer
software is copyrightable subject matter. Interpretative practices may
vary depending upon which of the three types of TRIPS Agreement
rules are being applied. Practice under the WIPO conventions pre-
cedes and post-dates entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement. WTO
dispute settlement panels will need to sort out the relationship be-
tween state practice under WIPO conventions pre- and post-dating
the TRIPS Agreement, and the interpretative impact of state practice
among parties that are not parties to the WTO Agreement. This is a
task well within the competence of WTO panels, but illustrates the
jurisprudential issues that are created by the concurrent operation of
rule-making bodies acting upon the same subject matter.
The WIPO Secretariat is not authorized by its charter documents
to render interpretations of WIPO-administered conventions on be-
half of its Contracting States. Yet the WIPO Secretariat may play a
role in WTO dispute settlement in a number of ways. A WTO dispute
settlement panel may request that the Secretariat provide advice on a
technical issue (such as by providing the negotiating history of a par-
ticular provision) that does not constitute an interpretative act. A
member of the WIPO Secretariat might be asked to serve as a mem-
ber of a VTO dispute settlement panel. This is certainly permissible
under the terms of the TRIPS Agreement and the Dispute Settlement
Understanding.4 Moreover, the Director-General of WIPO has al-
44. See TRIPS Dispute Settlement, supra note 2.
45. Id.
46. It.
1997]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
ready furnished an informal memorandum to a Contracting State offi-
cial regarding interpretation of a provision of a WIPO-administered
convention that was the subject of an ongoing dispute between two
WTO Members.4 7
3. WIPO Dispute Settlement
A Committee of Experts has been convened under WIPO aus-
pices to examine the preparation of a Draft Treaty on the Settlement
of Disputes Between States in the Field of Intellectual Property.43
This Committee first met in 1990, and active discussions concerning
the Draft Treaty are continuing as of early 1997. 49 A most striking
aspect of these negotiations within WIPO is that they are being pur-
sued with considerable vigor by many of the same OECD govern-
ments that moved the international IPRs center of gravity from WIPO
into the WTO.
There are sound reasons in favor of the establishment of an IPRs
dispute settlement forum outside of the WTO Dispute Settlement Un-
derstanding. First, not all potential IPRs disputes are subject to WTO
dispute settlement. Second, not all parties to multilateral IPRs con-
ventions are Members of the WTO, and so are not subject to WTO
dispute settlement. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the creation
of a dispute settlement forum outside the WTO may permit states to
resolve IPRs-related disputes in an environment that is less politically-
charged than the WTO. In the WTO, the stakes of dispute settlement
are often amplified by intense media scrutiny and domestic political
pressure on the state participants. States may find it useful to be able
to submit IPRs-related disputes to neutral dispute settlement without
the threat of trade sanctions looming against losing parties.
47. This information was provided to the author by a responsible of fcial within one of
the Member governments.
48. For background, see International Bureau of WIPO, Committee of Experts on the
Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes Between States, 5th Sess., May 10-21, 1993,
Draft Treaty on the Settlement of Disputes Between States in the Field of Intellectual
Property, WIPO Doc. SD/CEV/2, paras. 1-2, at 1 (Apr. 8, 1993).
49. See, e.g., WIPO 1995 Report, supra note 13. The United State:; delegation to the
WIPO Committee of Experts has so far taken the view that provision for TRIPS dispute
settlement in the WTO has eliminated any need for a separate agreement on dispute settle-
ment in WIPO.
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4. The Relationship between WTO and WIPO Dispute
Settlement
The potential establishment of a WIPO dispute settlement mech-
anism raises several significant issues with respect to the WTO and
TRIPS Agreement. The initial WIPO Draft Treaty set forth a number
of alternative spheres of application for the WIPO dispute settlement
mechanism.50 These initial proposals proved controversial, primarily
because they did not define the consequences of the initiation of dis-
pute settlement in either the WIPO or WTO forum.-" Work has con-
tinued on refining the formula for the sphere of application of the
Draft Treaty.5 The Committee of Experts remains divided over the
proper approach, with several delegations seeking to assure that WTO
dispute settlement is given priority within its sphere of application.- 3
It remains to be clarified whether, and to what extent, the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding and TRIPS Agreement may fore-
close the WTO Member parties to IPRs disputes from invoking the
jurisdiction of dispute settlement fora outside the WTO. As a mat-
50. See supra note 48. Theses included the settlement of disputes arising under any
multilateral treaty (including the WTO TRIPS Agreement) in the field of intellectual prop-
erty (including also treaties administered by WIPO), id. art. 3(1), alternative A and note
3.12, and alternatively, coverage solely of the settlement of disputes arising under treaties
exclusively administered by WIPO. Id. art. 3(1), alternative C and note 3.12. The Commit-
tee noted that its procedures would not apply when a source treaty precluded recourse to
procedures other than those specified in that source treaty, but observed that -all the po-
tential source treaties presently in force have provisions on dispute settlement that would
allow recourse to the envisaged procedures under the proposed Treaty." Id. note 327.
The TRIPS Agreement was not in force when the Committee Notes wyere prepared,
although the Dunkel Draft text of the TRIPS Agreement was available.
51. See eg., WIPO 1995 Report, supra note 13, Comments of the Delegation of the
European Communities, para. 17.
52. Much of the discussion at the Seventh Session of the Committee of Experts fo-
cused on a proposal by the European Communities. As described by the European Com-
munities, that proposal:
stipulated that once a procedure under the rules of some other intergovernmental
organization [e.g., the WTO] was in progress or had resulted in a settlement that
was considered final by that organization, no party to the dispute could unilater-
ally initiate a procedure for the settlement of the same dispute within the frame-
work of the proposed Treaty. Such a proposal would therefore avoid settlements
being submitted concurrently to two different sets of machinery.
Id. para. 45, at 11.
53. See WIPO 1995 Report, supra note 13, Comments by the Delegations of Canada
and Switzerland, paras. 64 and 61, respectively. The United States appears to be isolated in
its objection to the entire project.
54. See Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 23. Although there may be debate on
this point, since the independent operation of WIPO-administered conventions is not sus-
pended by the TRIPS Agreement, WTO Members that are parties to WIPO conventions
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ter of principle, it would appear desirable to suspend initiation of pro-
ceedings in a forum that is not first selected for the duration of
proceedings in the first selected forum because the existence of paral-
lel proceedings is likely to exacerbate inter-institutional tensions.
However, there is a corresponding need to minimize the risk that
states will choose to initiate proceedings in one forum in order to de-
lay proceedings in another.
There is no unique problem in the trade/IPRs field created by the
potential existence of alternative decisions on the same subject mat-
ter. Should a WIPO dispute settlement mechanism be created, WTO
Members would be expected to retain the power to authorize trade
sanctions in the event a Member did not comply with a WTO Dispute
Settlement Body recommendation or ruling. From a WTO perspec-
tive there should not, therefore, be great concern that the force of its
rulings would be undermined by WIPO rulings, since a Member
would not be able to avoid abiding by a WTO ruling by invoking an
alternative WIPO ruling, so long as the latter is not deemed binding
for the WTO.
B. Developing Country Institutional Perspective
It was evident prior to the outset of the Uruguay Round and
throughout the Round that the developing countries perceive WIPO
as a forum more favorable to their interests than the WTO. There are
several possible explanations for this preference, which probably in-
volve a combination of factors. First, insofar as the developing coun-
tries could have maintained the supremacy of WIPO in the field of
IPRs, they might have avoided the threat of trade sanctions as a po-
tential consequence of failing to protect OECD-based IPRs. It would
logically be in the interests of developing countries to maintain the
supremacy of a forum that did not threaten them. Second, WIPO has
a history of assisting developing countries in preparing laws, in train-
ing IPRs office personnel and in assisting in the creation of patent
protection system infrastructure (e.g., by providing prior art files on
CD-ROM). The WIPO Secretariat therefore may be perceived as
friendly to developing country interests. Third, the treaty negotiation
system of WIPO lacks the intensity of pressure for reaching strict con-
sensus that is in some circumstances present in the WTO, and the de-
veloping countries appear to perceive that the political balance of
generally should be entitled to pursue disputes under those conventions in a WIPO forum.
WTO Member governments negotiating in WIPO appear to accept this premise.
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power in WIPO is somewhat more favorable to them than the balance
in the WTO.
It would not be surprising, therefore, to find the developing coun-
tries advocating a substantial continuing role for WIPO in the interna-
tional IPRs field, although for the time being at least they have lost
the battle concerning the potential for trade sanctions emanating from
the WTO. If the OECD countries continue to perceive their IPRs-
related interests as they did throughout the Uruguay Round, they
might be expected to continue to support a stronger role for the
WTO. Yet as has been seen with respect to the Draft Treaty on the
Settlement of Disputes Between States in the Field of Intellectual
Property, there may not be the consensus of opinion within the
OECD that trade specialists expected.
C. Trade and IPRs Cultures
There may also be a difference in cultures among the interna-
tional trade community and the international IPRs community that
manifests itself in different governmental perspectives at the WTO
and WIIPO. Officials in IPRs offices in the OECD and developing
countries may have been frustrated by the transfer of principal au-
thority in the TPRs sphere to the trade specialists during the Uruguay
Round negotiations, and there may be a certain pressure among the
IPRs officials to reassert the centrality of WIPO in the international
IPRs field. IPRs officials are more accustomed to a skeptical public
policy analysis of IPRs protection issues than are trade specialists.
The field of IPRs protection has historically included a strong under-
current of skepticism in its scholarly literature-5
The potential of a cultural difference between the IPRs and trade
specialists is at least worthy of bringing to the surface for discussion
since the theme of cultural differences has permeated the debate con-
cerning the place of environmental rules in the international trading
system.56 It is also worth noting that the WTO has made considerable
55. See, e.g., SENATH TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC CotM,., 76mT CONG., IVES-
TIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONONIC POWER: PATENTS AND FREE EN:rERPPJSE
164 (Comm. Print 1941) (W. Hamilton, Monograph No. 31). See also SuBcoNI.I. ON PAT-
ENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMInTrEE OF THE JUDICIARY., STH
CONG., AN ECONOMIC REvIEw OF THE PATENT SvsTvi (Comm. Print 195S) (Fritz
Machlup).
56. See e.g., Edith Brown Weiss, Environment and Trade as Partners in Sustainable
Development, 86 Am. J. INT'L L. 728 (1992).
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progress in adapting its culture to environmental interests over the
past several years.
The foregoing suggests the potential for conflict in the creation
and implementation of separate IPRs rules within the WTO and
WIPO, the potential for conflict in dispute settlemenlt, a potential
struggle for supremacy involving developing and developed country
interests, and a potential clash of institutional cultures.
D. The Status Quo
Some of the potential inter-institutional conflicts involving the
WTO and WIPO, such as those that may arise in connection with the
parallel track negotiation of new substantive rules, may be substan-
tially ameliorated through action at the national (and regional) level.
If each national government takes steps to assure the consistency of its
positions in the WTO and WIPO forums, this would reduce the possi-
bility of conflicting results and the creation of inter-institutional ten-
sions. The importance to the national government of assuring that the
trade and IPRs communities speak with one voice should not be mini-
mized in this context.
Moreover, a certain level of inter-institutional rivalry and tension
may be healthy. This is one of the values, for example, of regional
integration mechanisms within the WTO system; that is, regional sys-
tems may generate innovative solutions that thereafter may be incor-
porated within the broader WTO framework. The same may apply as
between the WTO and WIPO, as parallel track developments gener-
ate alternative solutions to IPRs-related problems.
The WTO and WIPO will co-exist, and will eventually settle their
differences, without any major institutional adjustments. Neverthe-
less, some useful suggestions might be made.
IV. Inter-Institutional Proposals
A. Institutional Objectives
As a matter of institutional history, the roles of the GATT/WTO
and WIPO have been largely complementary. A review of the histori-
cal objectives of the GATT/WTO and WIPO and their existing institu-
tional strengths suggests that their roles should remain largely
complementary, and that the goal of public planners over the next two
decades should be to refine the distribution of roles between the two
institutions.
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The TRIPS Agreement negotiations were based on the recogni-
tion of a close relationship between IPRs and international economic
activity, and the acknowledgment of a certain gap between the GATT
and WIPO systems. The WIPO system facilitated the creation of
IPRs at the international level, but it did not assure their enforcement.
The GATT system assured the enforcement of liberal trade rules, but
did not explicitly recognize the principle of IPRs protection.
1. The GATT/WTO System
As a matter of institutional history, the central objective of the
GATIAVTO has been to provide the operating framework for the
progressive liberalization of the global trading system. This objective
has been carried out by the establishment of certain general principles
to govern the international trading system (e.g., national and XEFN
treatment), the negotiation of reductions in market access barriers
(e.g., tariffs and quotas), the reduction of general principles to specific
norms (e.g., the Tokyo Round agreements on technical barriers and
antidumping), and the consensus resolution of disputes (i.e., the Arti-
cle XXIII-based dispute settlement system). The institutional objec-
tives of the new WTO are largely identical to those of the former
GATr, adding a broader scope of subject matter coverage (i.e., the
new area agreements, including TRIPS), and attention to the principle
of sustainable development (e.g., the preamble to the WTO Agree-
ment), while at the same time moving away from consensus-based dis-
pute resolution.
In the field of IPRs, the ,,TO should maintain its principal objec-
tive of facilitating the liberalization of the international trading system
so as to promote worldwide economic growth. In the field of IPRs,
trade liberalization is understood as providing assurances against the
misappropriation of an agreed-upon basket of IPRs assets. Just as an
effective international trading system does not tolerate the misappro-
priation of imported goods as they pass through customs, so the sys-
tem should not tolerate the misappropriation of the agreed-upon
basket of IPRs assets as they cross territorial boundaries. Such misap-
propriation would upset the competitive balance foreseen by the
WTO Agreement. The goal of the WTO and its Dispute Settlement
Understanding is to maintain, and restore when necessary, that com-
petitive balance.5 7 Consensus within the WTO as to the proper basket
57. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann has identified the central goal of GATT dispute settle-
ment, as evidenced throughout the history of the organization, as the restoration of the
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of IPRs assets deserving of protection may fluctuate over time, and
changes in such consensus can be reflected in the primary instrument
expressing that consensus, the TRIPS Agreement.
2. The WIPO System
The WIPO system evolved over a long period of time in response
to technological changes, and in response to recognition that the coor-
dination of international rules to protect IPRs was necessary to the
effective promotion of the transborder flows of expression and ideas.
The historical objective of WIPO was to provide a framework for in-
ternational cooperation in the field of IPRs, and not to act as an inter-
national IPRs enforcement body. In light of this goal, WIPO
developed relatively efficient systems for the development of new in-
ternational IPRs rules, for the administration of agreed-upon systems,
and for the provision of technical training to facilitate the develop-
ment and maintenance of the international IPRs system.
B. The On-Going Allocation of Responsibilities
In light of institutional objectives in the field of IPRs, the primary
role of the WTO should be to maintain the competitive balance in
trade among WTO Members as foreseen by the TRIPS Agreement.
The primary roles of WIPO should be to promote technological devel-
opment, particularly in the developing countries, to provide a forum
for the negotiation of new multilateral IPRs rules (in coordination
with the TRIPS Council), and to administer multilateral IPRs conven-
tions as at present.
1. Rule-Making
The negotiation of new multilateral IPRs conventions and the re-
finements of existing conventions may be continued in the WIPO fo-
rum. The Contracting States of WIPO have successfully collaborated
in the formulation and adoption of substantive IPRs rules. Customary
practices that have evolved in WIPO for the elaboration of new rules
should continue to serve in the new dual-institutional framework. The
role of the WTO with respect to such new rules should be: to identify
competitive balance in trade foreseen by the parties. The GATf system has not admitted
the extraction of damages for a violation of the General Agreement (or for a non-violation
injury), even though equitable principles might favor such a restilt. Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, The Dispute Settlement System of the World Trade Organization and the
Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System Since 1948, [1994] 31 C.M.L.R. 1157
(1994).
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changes in the global IPRs environment that may result in a shift in
the competitive balance among Members, to bring these changes to
the attention of WIPO Contracting States to initiate the negotiation of
new rules where appropriate, and to adopt changes as necessary to the
TRIPS Agreement to establish a new consensus on the competitive
balance. Changes to the TRIPS Agreement may be based on new
rules agreed to in WIPO. Such changes may also be achieved directly
through negotiations within the VTO, for instance with regard to me-
dia and cultural issues that are closely related to services. Moreover,
negotiations within the VTO may encompass sensitive issues that
would require room for cross-concessions in other fields that the
WIPO forum cannot provide (that is, progress in fields of IPRs-re-
lated interest to OECD countries may continue to require the grant-
ing of concessions to developing countries in other fields, such as the
field of agricultural subsidies). The WIPO Committees of Experts,
through the WIPO Coordination Committee, could notify the TRIPS
Council of proposed changes to multilateral IPRs rules, and provide
an analysis of the potential impact of those changes. The TRIPS
Council may furnish a response to WIPO, pointing out where a differ-
ent approach may be desirable from a trade standpoint. The use of
WIPO as an initial venue for the negotiation of new rules would not
foreclose negotiations in the VTO regarding the same or a different
subject matter.
2. Dispute Settlement
The proper allocation of dispute settlement responsibilities is
very important. The completion of the WIPO Dispute Settlement
Treaty would provide an appropriate complementary dispute settle-
ment forum to that of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. The WIPO
forum might be allocated primary responsibility for the settlement of
disputes concerning the interpretation of substantive IPRs rules, with
the WTO forum being allocated principal responsibility for the main-
tenance and restoration of competitive balance in the field of trade. A
dispute involving interpretation of an IPRs standard might first be ad-
judicated at WIPO. A complaint based on a finding of a violation of
substantive standards could thereafter be brought to the WVTO, adding
an allegation of harm to the competitive balance (Le., nullification or
impairment). The NVTO could serve as dispute settlement forum of
first instance when the issue of enforcement of agreed-upon standards
within a national legal system is present. The IPRs Council (see pro-
posal infra) could be charged with proposing the proper dispute settle-
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ment forum of first instance if a conflict between the parties arises,
although a consensus voting structure in the IPRs Council will require
a default procedure.
3. Developmental Assistance
The strength of WIPO as an institution is its technical expertise
and skill in administration. Perhaps the major issue confronting the
international economic system in connection with IPRs and technol-
ogy is how to deal with existing disparities in levels of :echnological
capacity among states. The WIPO is well-suited to play the major role
in formulating and executing programs to aid in global technological
development, with the active cooperation of the TRIPS Council and
other WTO bodies. This is a primary objective for the international
economic system and for its institutions.
4. Administration
There is no reason to suggest that WIPO should not continue in
its role as international IPRs administrator, for example with respect
to the Patent Cooperation Treaty, since this is a task for which it is
institutionally suited.
One may not ignore the issue of financial resources., which may
be at the heart of government decision-making with respect to the
allocation of competences between the WTO and WIPO, The WIPO
generates much of its own resources and should not require major
budgetary enhancements in order to continue to fulfill its role as prin-
cipal international IPRs-system regulator. Its staff is largely in place.
The WTO, however, would require a major infusion of resources to
take over in many of the areas in which WIPO presently operates. In
the absence of a compelling reason for a change, it is doubtful that
governments will choose to undertake a major change in the scale of
the WTO Secretariat's operations.
C. New Institutional Arrangements
1. Cooperation
Cooperation between the WTO and WIPO might well be formal-
ized at the institutional level, and the creation of a charter document
that defines primary areas of institutional responsibility may be useful.
An Inter-Institutional IPRs and Trade Governing Council (IPRs
Council) might be created. The WTO TRIPS Council and the WIPO
Governing Bodies (or Coordination Committee) could be equally rep-
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resented on this body. At its initiation, the IPRs Council might make
decisions only by consensus, thus rendering the precise allocation of
seats as between WTO and WIPO Members less than critical. The
Chair of the IPRs Council might be rotated annually or biennially be-
tween the Chair of the TRIPS Council and the Chair of the WIPO
Governing Bodies.
The IEPRs Council would serve to coordinate the activities of the
WTO and WIPO across the range of IPRs-related activities, including
dispute settlement. The IPRs Council would seek to facilitate cooper-
ation between the WTO Committee on Trade and Development and
WIPO so as to enhance progress in the field of technological
development.
One of the objectives of the IPRs Council would be to explore
mechanisms for creating a greater complementarity between the
WTO and WIPO membership. This would include the pursuit of a
more universal adherence to their respective constitutive instruments
so as to reduce the possibility of conflict between the WTO and WIPO
on the basis of membership disparities.
2. Potential Consolidation
A cooperative institutional approach involving the WTO and
WIPO would be the most desirable for at least the medium term (ten
to fifteen years). Whether a consolidation of the WTO and WIPO
over the longer term may be desirable is an intriguing question. One
might imagine that over the course of several decades the WTO would
evolve into an international economic institution at which constitu-
tional-level decisions would be made across a broader spectrum of
subject matter areas. One might imagine that a decision-making
structure would evolve that would adequately reflect both the effec-
tive international economic power of states and a wide range of indi-
vidual and group interests. Outside the area of core decision-making
that would be undertaken at the WTO, international economic deci-
sion-making and administration would be distributed to its appropri-
ate level, whether international, regional, national or local.
In such a broad framework, international economic organizations
other than the WTO might function in the manner of executive Minis-
tries operating under the policy direction of the center. The Ministries
might be responsible for executing the details of policy. The WIPO
might become an executive operating arm of the WTO. The principal
policy decisions with respect to the international IPRs system would
be made within the WTO constitutional power structure, and policy
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would be executed within WIPO. A vertical chain of command would
exist. As with all such chains, uncertainties in the execution of policy
may arise. Thus, procedures for dealing with such uncertainties would
need to be worked out.
At the present time one should hesitate to consolidate the role of
WIPO under the direction of the WTO. There is some reason to
question whether the WTO is sufficiently developed as an institution
to recommend a significant enhancement of its role as a public policy
planning and execution agency in situations involving developmental
and consumer interests. Reference may be made here to a certain
"democracy deficit." This deficit evidences itself in a lack of trans-
parency (which WTO members are gradually seeking to remedy), and
is reflected in an environment for the negotiation of rules that appears
weighted in favor of the existing distribution of market-based power.58
There is no better place than the WTO for carrying out the present
purposes of the WTO. If the role of the WTO in formulating public
policy is to be significantly enhanced, however, the global constitu-
tional implications of such an enhancement must be thought through
with care.
58. Potential weaknesses in the democratic structure of the WTO are observed in
Thomas Cottier, The Impact of New Technologies on Multilateral Trade Regulation and
Governance, in PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION, supra note
2.
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